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Abstract
Is there an opportunity-performance trade-off in secondary education?*
Schools in secondary education face a dilemma. On the one hand, they would like to 
offer all students opportunities to develop their talent, and on the other hand they want 
to safeguard a minimum performance level. In tracked systems, this dilemma becomes 
more consequential as misallocation of students could lead to either denying access 
to a more optimal track or to lower performance of students that are placed too high. 
Based on data from the Netherlands Cohort Study on Education (NCO) from 2010 to 
2017, we find that only for 55% of schools there is a trade-off between opportunity 
and performance. These schools show a relative preference for either opportunity or 
performance. However, in the other schools, opportunity and performance are optimised 
at the same time; this dimension is related to the quality of the school. While controlling 
for the school’s potential student population, we show which school characteristics are 
associated with the relative preference and quality dimensions. 
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Introduction 
In all education systems, students get sorted, either in groups, tracks or in schools (LeTendre, 
Hofer, & Shimizu, 2003), but in early stratifying education systems, this sorting is more 
consequential. Early tracking is known to increase social inequality (e.g. Chmielewski, 2019; 
Van de Werfhorst, 2018) and might lead to an underdevelopment of students’ talent 
(Borghans, Diris, Smits, & de Vries, 2020). The problem at hand is that choices on placement 
at the time of selection are made on the basis of imperfect information, i.e. a noisy signal 
(Brunello, Giannini, & Ariga, 2007). Hence, the decision might turn out wrong: in hindsight, 
it was wrongly assumed that either the student was able to perform in that group (false 
positives) or that this was not the case (false negatives). Both types of errors negatively affect 
a student’s career: either students are denied access to a higher track (i.e. denying 
opportunities to develop their talent) or students underperform because they are allocated to a 
track that is too high for their ability level.  
In the Netherlands, both types of indicators are monitored in the accountability 
framework of the Inspectorate of Education (De Wolf and Janssens, 2007; Ehren, Altrichter, 
McNamara, & O’Hara, 2013; Inspectorate of Education, 2017). In this framework, schools 
are monitored on their performance with indicators such as exam scores or retention rates. 
These might suffer from too lenient selection. Similarly, schools are also held accountable for 
getting the best out of the students, i.e. granting them opportunity at a track that is optimal for 
their ability, which could suffer from a myopic focus on performance indicators.  
To cope with the possible consequences of the above-mentioned noisy selection 
instrument, schools can act differently. Expressed as a continuum, the tail-ends consist of 
lenient and stringent selection. At one end, schools could prefer to minimize their false 
negatives by granting students access to a higher track, even though they score just below the 
threshold. At the other end, schools could minimize their false positives by selecting more 
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stringently, and only select those eligible for the track. To gain more insight into this trade-
off, our first aim is to describe to what extent schools balance between giving opportunity or 
focusing on performance: 
To what extent do secondary schools face a trade-off between providing opportunities 
and the performance of students? (RQ 1). 
The dilemma of secondary schools as formulated in the above-mentioned trade-off is 
implicitly placed in the context of the value-added model, used to assess school quality 
(Everson, 2017). In the value-added model, school outcomes such as exam grades or 
retention are corrected for input differences. As input differences are highly correlated with 
giving opportunities and output differences with performance, the value-added model does 
not adequately grasp this trade-off dilemma. Two schools could end up having similar value-
added scores, but still be very different in how they reach this score. The one could give 
many opportunities at the expense of performance, while the other could aim for high 
performance at the cost of opportunity. Therefore, we think that we can advance the school 
effectiveness literature by explicitly looking at both dimensions: quality as well as relative 
preference. Both dimensions may be related to different school characteristics and both could 
subsequently have distinct implications for students’ careers. So, our second research 
question is:  
 Which school characteristics are related to quality and which are related to relative 
preferences for opportunity or performance? (RQ 2). 
Furthermore, school effectiveness research is hampered by interpreting the effects of 
the school’s student composition. This composition can be the result of deliberate choice of 
the school itself (selection), the choices made by students or their parents (self-selection) or 
simply a reflection of the potential student population in the vicinity of the school (Cabus and 
Cornelisz, 2017; Leist and Perry, 2019; Weßling and Bechler, 2019). It is important to 
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distinguish the former two from the latter, in order to make a distinction between the 
selectivity of a school versus the selectivity of the potential student population. Our third 
research question therefore reads: 
What is the effect of the social selectivity of the school on quality and relative 
preference for opportunity or performance? (RQ 3). 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a brief overview of the Dutch 
education system. Section 3 reviews the theory and introduces the hypotheses. Section 4 
discusses the data and methodology. Section 5 presents the results and Section 6 concludes.  
1. The Dutch education system  
Secondary education in the Netherlands is divided into five tracks reflecting various ability 
levels. Three 4-year vocational education tracks (VMBO-b, VMBO-k and VMBO-gt) qualify 
for various upper secondary vocational education tracks (MBO). The 5-year preparatory 
academic track (HAVO) gives access to the universities of applied sciences (HBO), and the 
6-year preparatory academic track (VWO) prepares for a research university (WO) (see 
Figure 1).  
At the end of primary education, a report about which track suits the student’s 
abilities best determines the eligibility for secondary education tracks. For the cohort under 
consideration, this report is based on the results of a standardized national cognitive test at the 
end of primary education, and the recommendation of the primary school teacher, based on 
the student’s overall performance as well as behavioural characteristics and motivation 
(Oomens, Scholten, & Luyten, 2017; Timmermans, de Boer, Amsing, & van der Werf, 2018).  
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Figure 1. Education tracks in secondary education.  
Note: The arrows depict pathways through the system. The red square indicates the tracks analysed in this 
study. Secondary education (light blue) is depicted relative to its duration (corresponding international grades 
are indicated at the left); upper secondary and tertiary education (dark blue) is not. 
 
Although the Dutch system is known for its early tracking in homogeneous classes at 
age 12, secondary schools have the autonomy to install comprehensive ability classes in the 
first year (grade 7; age 12) and as late as in the third year (grade 9; age 14) (see Korpershoek, 
Naayer, & Bosker, 2017). In school year 2011/2012 about 63% of the students were placed in 
a comprehensive ability class (own calculations). A school can have just a single track 
(‘categorale scholen’), or multiple tracks. Multi-track schools that consists of three or more 
tracks are usually called school communities (‘scholengemeenschap’). Depending on the 
supply of schools in their vicinity, students can thus opt for placement in a single-track school 
or a school community. 
Despite a substantial amount of autonomy, schools are also bounded by oversight 
(OECD, 2016). More specifically, they have to consider the criteria put forward by the 
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Inspectorate of Education (Ehren, et al., 2013; Inspectorate of Education, 2017). The 
Inspectorate formulates standards and expectations in the domain of legal requirements, the 
domain of the education process (e.g. the number of instruction hours), and the domain of 
performance and results. The performance and results indicators are fourfold: (1) the share of 
students placed in a higher track in the third year of secondary school compared to the 
primary school teacher’s recommendation, (2) the share of students that have followed lower 
(2b) and upper (2b) secondary education without retention or dropout, and (3) the average 
exam results (Inspectorate of Education, 2017).  
2. Theory 
Early allocation into different tracks is based on the assumption that selection in 
homogeneous classrooms “permit[s] a focused curriculum and appropriately paced 
instruction” (Hanushek and Wößmann, 2006, p. c63) in order to improve every student’s 
performance. Therefore, a valid and accurate selection is key for a well-functioning tracked 
system (Korthals and Dronkers, 2016; Smolkowski and Cummings, 2015), as it determines 
the degree of focus and pace allowed in class. 
However, the selection instrument on the placement contains noise. These relate to 
imperfect information on the ability of the student at the time of decision-making (Brunello, 
et al., 2007): what seemed a correct decision at the time of selection, might in the end not be 
the best fit for the student’s ability. One reason for the noise is the differential dynamic pace 
of the development of children’s brain (Knudsen, Heckman, Cameron, & Shonkoff, 2006). 
Also, during their secondary education career students are exposed to other teachers, 
curricula and classroom environments than in primary education (Muijs et al., 2014), which 
might affect their cognitive development. Furthermore, changes in motivation, preferences, 
expectations and access to information on the school system over and above ability measures 
6 
 
(Büchner and Van der Velden, 2013; Forster and van de Werfhorst, 2019; Timmermans, et 
al., 2018), might affect the predictive power of the selection instrument.  
On average, suboptimal track placements can be expressed in language that mimics 
hypothesis testing in statistics: first, those students who were wrongly assumed to be able to 
perform well in a certain track (false positives or Type I error) or, second, those who were 
wrongly assumed not to be able to perform in a certain track (false negatives or Type II error) 
(Smolkowski and Cummings, 2015). Thus, although one cannot speak of an erroneous 
placement decision at the time of decision per se (after all, there was no other information 
available yet), we use the statistical terms of Type I and Type II errors to express that the 
hypothesised ability tracks turned out to be a misfit.  
The Trade-Off between Opportunity and Performance 
In coping with the consequences of imperfect information when students enter secondary 
education, schools can put forward different alternatives, latently placed on a continuum 
ranging for selecting very strict to very lenient. This selection applies to both the selection 
when students enter the school and the school’s policy with regard to upward and downward 
mobility between tracks in later years. Schools might be very strict, thus lowering the fraction 
of Type I errors, but simultaneously increasing the fraction of Type II errors. The assumption 
of those schools is that this will result in accomplishing the highest possible performance 
rates, such as low retention rates and high exam grades. They will thus score higher on the 
second and third criterion of the Inspectorate, but lower on the first criterion as the actual 
track placement or upward mobility might not result in students who are tracked higher than 
the recommendation of the primary school teacher indicated. On the other hand, schools 
might focus on giving opportunities to students at the start of secondary education or by 
being upward mobile and thus increase the number of students placed higher than the primary 
school teacher recommended. This will decrease the Type II errors but might increase the 
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Type I errors. The school thus risks decreased performance rates. Hence, a trade-off 
mechanism comes to the fore, which is also underpinned by the statistical insight that Type I 
and Type II errors are by definition negatively correlated (Sheskin, 2004). Thus, schools face 
a trade-off between giving opportunities to students and their average performance indicators 
(Trade-off hypothesis). 
Quality and Relative Preferences 
School accountability research shows that quality indicators are an integral part of the 
Inspectorate’s school oversight and thus in the choices schools make in their policy (De Wolf 
and Janssens, 2007; Ehren, et al., 2013). Plotting performance and opportunity indicators of 
schools in a two-dimensional graph sheds light on the matter in a visual way (see Figure 2). 
The quality of schools is reflected by a combination of “the degree to which [it] scores better 
than other schools, corrected for student intake characteristics” and the extent to which it is 
good at “compensating for input characteristics” (Reynolds et al., 2014, p. 205).  
In our framework, we follow the Inspectorate and mimic their quality indicators. Both 
the placement of the student in the third year compared to the primary school teacher’s 
recommendation (mimicking the input compensation mechanism), and the pace at which 
students move through secondary school (mirroring the quality outcome score), are part of 
the quality indicators. Therefore, we regard high scores on both performance and opportunity 
as qualitatively good schools. These are the schools in Quadrant 1. Reversely, if schools 
score low on both dimensions, they can be labelled as low-quality schools (Quadrant 2). In 
Figure 2, diagonal line A depicts this dimension of school quality, which is simply defined as 
the sum of the standardised score of the two underlying variables (opportunity and 
performance). 
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Figure 2: Quality and Relative Preference Outcomes in Opportunity and Performance.  
Note: the dots represent hypothetical schools. Line A depicts the quality dimension; Line B depicts the relative 
preference dimension. 1 = high-quality schools; 2 = low-quality schools; 3 = relative preference for opportunity; 
4 = relative preference for performance. 
However, two schools with the same score on the quality indicator might still differ in how 
they reach this quality score. Certain schools might combine a high opportunity score with a 
relatively lower performance score (schools in Quadrant 3), while other schools might 
combine a relatively lower opportunity score with a higher performance score (Quadrant 4). 
Both will end up with an ‘average’ quality score, but they are nevertheless different in their 
approach. This is depicted by the relative preference diagonal B. This dimension of relative 
preference reflects the consequences of choices that schools might make in their policy. This 
does not mean that schools always make these policy choices deliberately. The relative 
preference is defined as the subtraction of the standardised score of the two underlying 
variables (opportunity and performance). Given this definition, quality and relative 
preference are, by definition, orthogonal (see also the operationalisation section).   
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Type of Schools and the Quality and Relative Preference Dimensions 
As schools have considerable autonomy (OECD, 2016), we will discuss and hypothesize 
different characteristics of schools and their association with quality and relative preferences. 
First, there are characteristics that schools have no influence on: urbanisation level and the 
social composition of the potential student population in the school’s so-called student supply 
radius. We will control for those factors. Second, there are school characteristics that schools 
can influence in the medium to long-term: their track size, denomination and instalment of 
comprehensive classes. We will especially focus on and derive hypotheses about the structure 
of the tracks within the school  (Korpershoek, et al., 2017) that enables schools to modify 
track placement decisions (Van der Velden and Weßling, forthcoming). Finally, the third type 
of factor that determines a school’s relative preferences and quality relates to the 
characteristics of the student population, net of the composition of the potential student 
population in the neighbouring area of the school. This is related to either the specific 
selection of schools or the self-selection of students (or their parents) in choosing a specific 
school (e.g. Leist and Perry, 2019). 
Flexibility Mechanisms within the Institutional Structure 
The selection regimes in education can broadly be described according to three models: a 
sponsored mobility, an open contest mobility, and a tournament model (Rosenbaum, 1979; 
Turner, 1960). If there is no permeability between different tracks after the entry into 
secondary education, it aligns with the ‘sponsored mobility regime’ of Turner (1960). In this 
model schools have strict entry selection requirements, but at the same time they make sure 
that those who are selected will get a diploma and will thus perform well (see also 
Inspectorate of Education, 2016, pp. 22-23). In this regime Type I errors are reduced at the 
expense of Type II errors.  
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However, when there are multiple moments to decide upon the placement of the 
student after the start of secondary education, the selection regime rather resembles the 
‘contest mobility regime’ (Turner, 1960) or the ‘tournament mobility regime’ Rosenbaum 
(1979). The distinction between the two models is that in Turner’s model those who do not 
make it to a track still have an opportunity to reach for it another time (‘new round, new 
chances’), while in the tournament model students have to perform continuously in order to 
get a diploma (Jennings, 2010, p. 228; Rosenbaum, 1979, p. 223; Turner, 1960, p. 861). In 
both models, the amount of Type II errors is decreased. However, the ‘contest mobility 
regime’ also reduces the number of Type I errors. Not only are able students who in first 
instance were not selected given opportunities (Type II), but also unable students who were 
selected are now on the right (lower) track (Type I) (Van der Velden, 2011).  
The different selection regimes are mirrored in how Dutch schools use the flexibility 
possibilities in track placements. Dutch schools have these flexibility options because of three 
structural characteristics: single-track schools, school communities and comprehensive tracks 
in the first or second year (Korpershoek, et al., 2017). 
First, in a single-track school there are no options to move to a different track within 
the same school. Although students always can transfer to another school, transferring within 
the same school lowers the bar to do so. In single-track schools, the permeability between 
tracks and thus the option to reduce the total amount of misallocated students is lower. 
Following our theoretical model, we assume that both the amount of opportunities given to 
students is low in a single-track school and the performance of students who are wrongly 
selected in the track is low, therefore the single-track school is likely to score low on our 
quality indicator. The single-track schools most closely resemble the sponsored mobility 
regime, with a relative preference for performance over opportunity (Inspectorate of 
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Education, 2016, p. 22). We therefore hypothesise that single-track schools score low on the 
quality dimension and have a relative preference for performance (Single-track hypothesis).  
Second, unlike single-track schools, school communities allow students more 
mobility within the same school and, consequently, to be better allocated (Inspectorate of 
Education, 2019, p. 90). The school environment within a school community is more similar 
across tracks, transferring information about students is easier, and teachers overlap across 
tracks, all making mobility between tracks easier (Bronneman-Helmers, Herweijer, & 
Vogels, 2002, pp. 102-115). Within a school community, there are more possibilities to select 
more lenient, thus lowering the Type II error, because the mobility between tracks is easier 
and the placement is thus less final, which in turn also reduces the Type I error. This type of 
school could enable a contest mobility regime. We therefore hypothesise that schools that are 
part of a school community score high on the quality dimension and show a relative 
preference for opportunity (School community hypothesis).  
Third, literature on the placement in comprehensive ability classes shows that they 
provide an opportunity for students at the margin to catch up and reach their full potential 
(Borghans, et al., 2020; Van Elk, Van der Steeg, & Webbink, 2011). Moreover, it is an 
opportunity for the school to gather more information about the student to base their later 
tracking decision on (Mühlenweg, 2007), since students’ true ability is more uncertain at an 
earlier age (Knudsen, et al., 2006). It is a feature that is helpful for the late bloomers and thus 
compensates for (minimal) differential developmental trajectories at the time of selection (see 
also Dustmann, Puhani, & Schönberg, 2017; Inspectorate of Education, 2016, p. 23). As 
such, this feature enables a contest mobility regime in the first one or two years. We therefore 
expect that schools with one- or two-year comprehensive classes score high on the quality 
dimension and have a relative preference for opportunity (Comprehensive ability classes 
hypothesis).  
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The selection of students into schools 
The value-added models that try to describe school quality do control for the student intake 
and make a comparison between schools fairer, as research shows that certain student 
compositions are associated with higher performance scores (Reynolds, et al., 2014; Wenger, 
Gärtner, & Brunner, 2020). Girls and students from high SES families are performing better 
on average and non-western students and students from divorced parents perform worse 
(Armor, Marks, & Malatinszky, 2018; Havermans, Vanassche, & Matthijs, 2017; Luyten, 
Schildkamp, & Folmer, 2009; Van Hek, Kraaykamp, & Pelzer, 2018).  
However, the composition of the school population is the outcome of both the 
potential group of students in the vicinity of the school, their preferences and the selection 
policy of the school itself. Having two schools with the same composition could be either 
ascribed to the same composition of students in the vicinity of the schools or due to similar 
selection processes (deliberate either by the school or by the students and their parents), i.e. 
we also have to control for the potential student population in the surrounding 
neighbourhoods. Some schools are located in areas that are more densely populated with high 
or low performing students (e.g. Nieuwenhuis and Hooimeijer, 2016).  
We therefore disentangle between the potential student composition and actual 
student composition, by looking at characteristics of the eligible student population in a 5 km 
radius of the school. Apart from performance constraints, students and their parents are free 
to choose which school they attend. There is no strong evidence that parents move to a 
different neighbourhood to be able to attend a higher quality school (Borghans, et al., 2020). 
Apart from the official performance related entry rules, students and parents can self-select or 
schools can select on other characteristics. Targeting policies (e.g. advertisements; open days; 
philosophical denomination; prior performance scores) can attract a social selective group of 
students (Allen, Bijlsma, Borghans, & Poulissen, 2016; Cabus and Cornelisz, 2017; Jennings, 
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2010; Leist and Perry, 2019). As schools have no direct effect on the potential student 
composition, but do have influence over their (self-)selection, we assume that the quality 
score will be higher for schools that attract relatively more girls and high SES students and 
less one-parent household students compared to the potential student population in the school 
radius (Quality selection hypothesis).  
The preferences of schools for either opportunity or performance stem from 
incentives to differentiate in policies to compete with other schools. On the one hand, the 
preferences of schools are demand-driven and depend on which school features students, 
parents and primary school class mates consider important (Cabus and Cornelisz, 2017; 
Glazerman and Dotter, 2017; Jennings, 2010; Ruijs and Oosterbeek, 2019). We can assume 
that certain types of students seek a certain type of school and that parents want to prevent 
status decline for their children (Breen and Goldthorpe, 1997), which makes high SES 
parents more inclined to seek a school with a preference for performance. Moreover, research 
shows that high SES parents are better informed about school characteristics than low SES 
parents (e.g. Forster and van de Werfhorst, 2019). Hence, schools that select more high SES 
students than expected on the basis of the potential student composition in the school’s 
supply radius are more likely to have a relative preference for performance (High SES 
preference selection hypothesis).  
The preferences may, on the other hand, also relate to a certain philosophy that is 
propagated a certain school and thus cause a differential school supply. Schools with a 
philosophical or religious orientation are also concerned with teaching the students certain 
norms and values (Bronneman-Helmers, et al., 2002). They might find it important to provide 
more opportunities to students that adhere to such principles, even at the cost of performance, 
and thus opt for opportunity over performance (Denominational preference hypothesis).  
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3. Data, methodology and operationalisation 
Data 
We make use of the data from the Netherlands Cohort Study on Education (NCO) 
(Haelermans et al., 2020) and observe schools and their students within the publicly funded 
secondary school system from school year 2011/2012 to 2017/2018. Next to background 
information of the student and the schools, the records contain information at the individual 
level about the students’ school careers. An important advantage of using register data is that 
it covers almost all students in secondary education; less than 2% of the Dutch schools are 
privately funded schools (Haelermans, et al., 2020). However, we have to keep in mind that 
the register data only contain ‘objective’ variables and not the kind of subjective variables 
that may also play a role in the track placement of students.  
Operationalisation of key variables 
First, the outcome variables of interest in this paper are discussed: (1) opportunity; (2) 
performance; (3) relative preference and (4) quality. Moreover, in Appendix 1, we will 
describe the independent (control) variables that are used in our analyses. Second, the 
selection into schools will be discussed.  
Opportunity. Opportunity is defined as students whose actual track placement in the third 
year of secondary school is higher than the primary school teacher’s recommendation. For 
instance, if the student resides in the VWO track and has a HAVO/VWO recommendation or 
lower, we define this as giving this student an opportunity. Similarly, if the student is 
allocated to a HAVO class on a VMBO-gt/HAVO recommendation or lower, this is defined 
as an opportunity. The resulting scale has a potential range from 0% to 100%.  
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Performance. Performance is defined as the percentage of students in the track who 
graduated without delay in the secondary education track for which they enrolled in the third 
year of secondary education. All years spent in secondary education are considered, so also 
those before the third year, when calculating the percentage of students who receive a 
diploma without delay. The resulting scale has a potential range from 0% to 100%. 
Quality and relative preferences. As described in the theory section, we define quality (Q) as 
the sum of the scores on performance (P) and opportunity (O) of a school (j). To ensure an 
equal weight, both variables are standardised (z).  
𝑧𝑄𝑗 = 𝑧𝑃𝑗 + 𝑧𝑂𝑗  
Next, we define the relative preference (RP) as the difference between these two variables, by 
subtracting the standardised opportunity measure from the standardised performance 
measure.   
𝑧𝑅𝑃𝑗 = 𝑧𝑃𝑗 − 𝑧𝑂𝑗 
Note that, by definition, this means that opportunity and performance are orthogonal and thus 
have a correlation of zero.  
Selection into schools. We define the selectivity of the school as the deviation of the actual 
school composition from the potential composition based on the eligible student composition 
in a 5 km radius around the school. A radius of 5 km is considered appropriate in the 
Netherlands, as most students live within this range and because in densely populated areas 
bigger radii would yield meaningless composition effects (Allen, et al., 2016). The eligibility 
16 
 
is determined on the basis of the primary school teacher’s recommendation.1 We calculate 
composition difference scores on the percentage of girls, non-western migration status, high 
paternal income and one-parent families. The selectivity of a school is then expressed in the 
form of a segregation index: 
I=∑
ngroup
nschool
N
n=1
- 
ngroup
nradius
 × 100 
where the 𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝, 𝑛𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙 and 𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑠 represent the number of students with a certain 
characteristic, the number of students in the school and in the radius respectively. The 
differential score has a potential range of -100 to +100. The interpretation of the – or + is the 
deviation in percentage points from a situation where the actual composition of the school 
equals the potential composition of students in the school’s radius. A negative number 
indicates that there are more students with that characteristic in the radius than at the school 
and vice versa for a positive number.  
Methodology and analysing strategy 
We estimate opportunity, performance, quality and relative preferences for different 
characteristics of schools using ordinary least squares regression (OLS). We run separate 
analyses for HAVO and VWO, since the tracks differ in time, content and the occurrence of 
ceiling-effects. We exclude VMBO tracks due to floor-effects and limited variation in our 
operationalised independent and dependent variables.  
 
1 For eligibility for HAVO, all students with a straight HAVO recommendation in that radius are 
considered, as well as the proportion of a recommendation consisting of more than one track. 
For HAVO/VWO and VMBO-gt/HAVO, half of the students are eligible and for 
recommendations consisting of HAVO and two more tracks, a third of the students are eligible. 
In this case half or a third of the students are randomly assigned to the eligible HAVO pool.  
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The cohort we analyse enters secondary education in the school year 2011/2012. We 
use the third-year (grade 9; age 15) secondary education cohort (2013/2014) as a criterion of 
selection. In this grade 9, there are hardly any comprehensive classes, so each individual can 
be linked to a certain track in the school. Of those students, we observe the primary school 
teacher’s recommendation and test score of the school year 2010/2011, retention and 
acceleration in secondary education of those students entering secondary education in school 
year 2011/2012, switching of track and the final exam results. Most of the exam results are 
nominally obtained in school year 2015/2016 for HAVO and in school year 2016/2017 for 
VWO (see also the operationalisation section). Table 1 gives an overview of the cohort 
structure of the data.   
Table 1. Cohort design of the data. 
2010/2011 2011/2012 2012/2013 2013/2014 2014/2015 2015/2016 2016/2017 2017/2018 
Grade 6 Grade 7 Grade 8 Grade 9 Grade 10 Grade 11  Grade 12  
Primary 
schoolteacher 
recommendation 
and test score 
First year  Second year  Third year 
entry 
cohort 
Exam year 
VMBO 
Exam year 
HAVO 
Exam year 
VWO 
 
 
Starting from our individual level dataset, we made the following selections. First, we only 
included students that were either in a VWO or HAVO track in grade 9. Second, we excluded 
students that had a primary school teacher’s recommendation that consisted of three or more 
adjacent tracks, because for these cases it was not possible to calculate the opportunity score 
(for VWO this amounts to 0.8% of all recommendations in 2010; for HAVO to 1.1%). This 
results in 43,278 students in the third year of the VWO-track. For HAVO this number is 
42,020. Third, after aggregating the data to the school level, small schools with tracks that 
have less than 20 students in each observed cohort year are excluded as well. Lastly, we 
excluded schools that did not have any information on any of the variables used in the 
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multivariate analysis. This results in 413 schools that offer a HAVO-track and 429 schools 
that offer a VWO-track.  
In Table 2 below, we show descriptive statistics for the analyses for both HAVO and 
VWO. The dependent variables are standardised, hence the mean of 0. The potential student 
composition in the school’s supply radius varies strongly, if we consider the relative high 
standard deviation. Furthermore, the percentage of students that received a recommendation 
that is higher than the test score implies also varies substantially between schools. The track 
size, school denomination, urbanisation, school community, single-track school and 
comprehensive classes are dummy variables, therefore the mean indicates the percentage of 
schools in the sample. Finally, the difference scores on selection variables have a theoretical 
range from -100 to +100 and show quite some variation given the size of the standard 
deviation.  
The regression models are built-up as follows: first, we enter factors that describe the 
context that schools have to deal with when making policy decisions. Schools can hardly 
influence those contextual factors and therefore these factors should be controlled for: 1) 
potential student composition within the supply radius of a school; 2) the urbanisation level 
and 3) the extent to which the supplying primary schools are systematically giving a 
recommendation that is higher than their national test scores suggest. Second, we enter 
characteristics of schools that can be changed in the medium to long-term: track size, 
denomination and the structure of tracks within the school. Third, we enter specific selection 
of schools or the self-selection of students (or their parents) in choosing a specific school into 
the model.  
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for both HAVO and VWO 
  
HAVO 
  
VWO  
 N 
Mean/ 
Proportion Std. Dev. N 
Mean/ 
Proportion Std. Dev 
Dependent variables       
Opportunity 413 24,659 14,454 429 39,632 17,889 
Performance 413 65,329 12,379 429 67,945 11,191 
Quality: performance + opportunity 413 0,000 1,319 429 0,000 1,159 
Relative preference: performance - 
opportunity 413 0,000 1,503 429 0,000 1,630 
       
Composition of 5km supply radius       
% girls 413 0,503 0,041 429 0,475 0,050 
% students with non-western 
migration background 413 0,144 0,118 429 0,103 0,076 
% one-parent households 413 0,162 0,059 429 0,131 0,052 
% high SES 413 0,459 0,086 429 0,568 0,084 
       
Track size       
0-60 students 413 0,295  429 0,336  
60-120 students 413 0,598  429 0,529  
More than 120 students 413 0,107  429 0,135  
       
Urbanisation       
Not urban 413 0,041  429 0,030  
Somewhat urban 413 0,169  429 0,168  
Moderately urban 413 0,245  429 0,231  
Strongly urban 413 0,344  429 0,354  
Very strongly urban 413 0,201  429 0,217  
       
Denomination       
Public schools 413 0,305  429 0,310  
Non-religious 413 0,097  429 0,093  
Religious 413 0,598  429 0,597  
       
Single-track school    429 0,093  
School community 413 0,874     
       
One year comprehensive classes 413 0,431  429 0,401  
Two years comprehensive classes 413 0,487  429 0,422  
       
Social selectivity       
Difference score girls 413 0,841 8,649 429 5,975 8,948 
Difference score non-western 413 -1,236 11,033 429 -0,897 8,106 
Difference score high SES 413 2,499 10,089 429 3,562 9,929 
Difference score one-parent 
households 413 1,763 6,246 429 2,328 5,315 
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4. Results 
We first discuss the results regarding the trade-off between opportunity and performance. 
Thereafter, we discuss the results of school characteristics on quality and relative preferences. 
We discuss the results of school characteristics on opportunity and performance separately in 
Appendix 2. 
The trade-off 
The correlation between opportunity and performance is -0.328 in the case of VWO and -
0.129 in the case of HAVO, as can be seen in Table 3. This indicates a low to modest trade-
off, but by no means a strong one. A visual representation of the trade-off is given in Figure 
3, where clusters of schools are depicted in the two-dimensional graph. The clusters of 
schools are scattered over the graph and do not indicate a strong negative relationship.  
Figure 3: Opportunity and Performance graph for HAVO (left) and VWO (right).  
Note: the dots are midpoints of clusters of schools 
Another clue towards having leeway in avoiding trade-offs lies in the distribution of the 
schools over the quadrants when opportunity is set against performance in a graph. In the 
case of the VWO-track, the numbers in the quadrants that trade performance for opportunity 
(27%) and opportunity for performance (29%) together consist of 56% of all schools; 24% 
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are high quality schools and 20% low quality schools. For HAVO, the quadrants that trades 
off performance for opportunity (33%) or opportunity for performance (22%) together consist 
of 55% of all schools as well, whereas 24% of the schools could be labelled as schools with 
high quality and 21% as schools with low quality. 
Table 3. Correlations between the dependent variables 
HAVO Quality Relative preferences Opportunity Performance 
Relative preferences 0,000    
Opportunity 0,660 -0,751   
Performance 0,660 0,751 -0,129  
     
VWO Quality Relative preferences Opportunity Performance 
Relative preferences 0,000    
Opportunity 0,580 -0,815 
  
Performance 0,580 0,815 -0,328 
 
Relative preferences and quality  
The results for the highest academic track VWO suggest the following. Schools with more 
high SES students in their supply radius have a higher score on the quality indicator. Schools 
that have more students with a recommendation that is higher than the test score are 
negatively correlated with the quality score. Schools that have a comprehensive class in the 
first or first two years score higher on the quality dimension, as well as schools that have 
selected more girls and high SES students than their respective supply radius averages would 
suggest. The effect sizes of especially one- and two-year comprehensive classes is large: 
0.469 and 0.448, respectively.  
With regard to the relative preferences of the VWO-schools, schools in high SES radii 
have a preference for performance over opportunity, and the same holds for single-track 
schools. Schools that have a religious denomination have a preference for opportunity over 
performance, as well as schools with one- or two-year year comprehensive classes. 
Moreover, if schools select more girls than would have been expected given the supply radius 
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average, they prefer opportunity over performance. The opposite holds for schools that select 
more high SES students than the supply radius average: they are preferring performance over 
opportunity. Here, single-track schools, comprehensive classes and selection on high SES 
have the largest effect sizes, ranging in absolute value between 0.191 and 0.297.  
These results suggest that the comprehensive ability classes hypothesis is confirmed; 
the single-track hypothesis is only confirmed when it comes to preferences. Moreover, it 
seems that the denominational preference selection hypothesis is confirmed as well as the 
quality selection hypothesis, at least when it comes to selecting girls and high SES students. 
For HAVO, the results show that the composition of the supply radius correlates positively 
with quality when it comes to girls and high SES students and negatively when it comes to 
one-parent households. Also, if a school has more students whose recommendation is higher 
than the national test score, the quality indicator is lower. When a track is part of a school 
community it is positively related to quality; the effect being quite substantial 0.179. Lastly, 
all selection indicators are significantly different from zero, meaning that if a school selects 
more girls, and high SES students than the average of the supply radius indicates, this is 
associated with a higher score on the quality dimension. Their effect sizes are also 
substantial, in absolute value ranging up to 0.257. Interestingly, this also holds for a positive 
selection on non-western students: this has a positive effect of 0.118, after controlling for 
selection on high SES2. For the selection on students from one-parent households the 
correlation is negative.  
When it comes to the relative preference of the HAVO-schools, we see that the more 
students with a high SES live in the supply radius of a school, the more the school prefers 
 
2 The effect size of selection on non-western migrants without controlling for high SES parents is not 
significant: 0.001. 
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performance over opportunity. A school that is located in a more urbanised municipality 
correlates positively with a preference for opportunity over performance than schools in more 
rural municipalities; the effect being quite substantial ranging up to -0.365 for the most 
urbanised municipality. Medium (60-120) and large-sized (120 and more) school tracks tend 
to prefer performance over opportunity, while the reverse holds for tracks that are part of a 
school community. When schools select more girls than expected on the basis of the supply 
radius, it correlates with a preference of opportunity over performance. Instead, schools that 
are selecting more high SES students have a preference of performance over opportunity. The 
effect size of the last two indicators are also quite relevant, -0.180 and 0.278 respectively.  
These results suggest that the school community hypothesis is confirmed. Moreover, it seems 
that the quality selection hypothesis is confirmed, as well as the high SES preference 
selection hypothesis.  
These regressions explain a large percentage of the variance in the outcome measure, 
with an explained variance for the quality dimension of 0.224 for HAVO and 0.264 for 
VWO, whereas for the relative preference dimension these numbers are 0.225 and 0.374, 
respectively.  
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Table 4. Regressions on Quality and Relative Preferences for VWO 
  
 
Quality           Relative Preferences         
VWO M1    M2    M3    M1    M2    M3    
 b  se beta b  se beta b  se beta b  se beta b  se beta b  se beta 
Constant 0,983  0,760  0,038  0,738  -1,527  0,830  -0,577  1,094  0,169  0,966  -1,397  1,076  
                         
Composition of 5km supply radius                         
% girls -1,037  1,113 -0,045 -0,968  1,038 -0,042 0,638  1,073 0,027 -0,946  1,602 -0,029 -1,151  1,358 -0,035 -1,311  1,391 -0,040 
% students with non-western migration background 1,145  1,101 0,075 0,480  1,053 0,032 0,621  1,049 0,041 -0,865  1,586 -0,040 -0,216  1,378 -0,010 -0,319  1,359 -0,015 
% one-parent households -1,671  1,459 -0,075 -2,078  1,379 -0,093 -2,228  1,411 -0,099 0,600  2,101 0,019 0,696  1,804 0,022 2,081  1,829 0,066 
% high SES 1,716 * 0,704 0,125 1,089  0,674 0,079 2,293 ** 0,788 0,167 1,730  1,013 0,090 2,111 * 0,882 0,109 4,615 *** 1,021 0,239 
Urbanisation (ref. Not urban)                         
Somewhat urban -0,154  0,348 -0,050 0,044  0,327 0,014 0,001  0,319 0,000 0,673  0,500 0,155 0,428  0,428 0,098 0,386  0,413 0,089 
Moderately urban -0,346  0,349 -0,126 -0,089  0,331 -0,032 -0,133  0,323 -0,048 0,702  0,503 0,182 0,342  0,433 0,088 0,204  0,418 0,053 
Strongly urban -0,197  0,357 -0,081 0,174  0,338 0,072 0,116  0,331 0,048 0,953  0,514 0,280 0,308  0,443 0,091 0,135  0,429 0,040 
Very strongly urban -0,301  0,412 -0,107 0,112  0,391 0,040 0,084  0,382 0,030 0,860  0,593 0,218 0,081  0,512 0,020 0,007  0,495 0,002 
% recommendation higher than test score -0,047 *** 0,010 -0,246 -0,040 *** 0,009 -0,211 -0,038 *** 0,009 -0,198 -0,031 * 0,014 -0,116 -0,032 ** 0,012 -0,119 -0,018  0,012 -0,068 
Track size (ref. (0-60 students)                         
60-120 students     -0,174  0,119 -0,075 -0,197  0,119 -0,085     0,332 * 0,155 0,102 0,107  0,155 0,033 
More than 120 students     0,018  0,175 0,005 -0,037  0,174 -0,011     0,541 * 0,229 0,114 0,273  0,226 0,057 
Denomination (ref. Public schools)                         
Non-religious     0,300  0,200 0,075 0,247  0,195 0,062     -0,129  0,261 -0,023 -0,250  0,253 -0,045 
Religious     0,149  0,117 0,063 0,111  0,115 0,047     -0,361 * 0,153 -0,109 -0,392 ** 0,149 -0,118 
Single-track schools     0,070  0,250 0,017 0,150  0,248 0,038     1,947 *** 0,327 0,348 1,661 *** 0,322 0,297 
One year comprehensive class     1,115 *** 0,196 0,472 1,108 *** 0,191 0,469     -0,740 ** 0,256 -0,223 -0,778 ** 0,247 -0,234 
Two year comprehensive class     1,040 *** 0,195 0,444 1,051 *** 0,191 0,448     -0,724 ** 0,256 -0,220 -0,629 * 0,248 -0,191 
Social selectivity                         
Difference score girls         0,023 *** 0,006 0,181         -0,016 * 0,008 -0,089 
Difference score non-western         0,004  0,007 0,030         -0,007  0,009 -0,034 
Difference score one-parent households         0,015 * 0,007 0,131         0,040 *** 0,010 0,244 
Difference score high SES         -0,020  0,010 -0,092         -0,014  0,014 -0,046 
                         
R2 0,080    0,215    0,264    0,035    0,320    0,374    
N 429    429    429    429    429    429    
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Table 5. Regressions on Quality and Relative Preferences for HAVO 
 Quality           Relative Preferences         
HAVO  M1    M2    M3    M1    M2    M3    
 b  se beta b  se beta b  se beta b  se beta b  se beta b  se beta 
Constant -0,661  1,052  -1,857  1,064  -3,301 ** 1,060  0,206  1,210  1,225  1,215  0,875  1,207  
                         
Composition of 5km supply radius                         
% girls 1,712  1,559 0,053 2,123  1,534 0,066 4,585 ** 1,534 0,143 0,752  1,792 0,021 0,308  1,751 0,008 -1,303  1,746 -0,036 
% students with non-western migration background -0,021  0,996 -0,002 0,499  0,988 0,045 1,092  0,952 0,098 1,726  1,145 0,135 1,509  1,128 0,118 1,808  1,084 0,142 
% one-parent households -4,366 ** 1,666 -0,194 -4,205 * 1,667 -0,187 -4,453 ** 1,656 -0,198 0,162  1,915 0,006 -0,130  1,903 -0,005 -0,168  1,885 -0,007 
% high SES 1,784 * 0,865 0,116 2,403 ** 0,866 0,156 3,430 *** 0,906 0,223 1,956 * 0,994 0,111 1,246  0,989 0,071 3,079 ** 1,032 0,175 
Urbanisation (ref. Not urban)                         
Somewhat urban -0,054  0,351 -0,015 -0,100  0,344 -0,028 -0,063  0,329 -0,018 -0,445  0,404 -0,111 -0,501  0,392 -0,125 -0,494  0,375 -0,124 
Moderately urban 0,214  0,348 0,070 0,193  0,342 0,063 0,200  0,329 0,065 -0,819 * 0,401 -0,235 -1,035 ** 0,391 -0,296 -0,965 * 0,374 -0,276 
Strongly urban 0,348  0,350 0,125 0,344  0,344 0,124 0,392  0,329 0,141 -0,946 * 0,402 -0,299 -1,111 ** 0,392 -0,352 -1,092 ** 0,375 -0,345 
Very strongly urban 0,393  0,427 0,119 0,431  0,420 0,131 0,455  0,404 0,138 -1,369 ** 0,491 -0,365 -1,511 ** 0,479 -0,403 -1,366 ** 0,460 -0,365 
% recommendation higher than test score -0,022  0,011 -0,099 -0,030 ** 0,011 -0,135 -0,032 ** 0,011 -0,147 -0,035 ** 0,013 -0,140 -0,023  0,013 -0,093 -0,016  0,012 -0,063 
Track size (ref. (0-60 students)                         
60-120 students     0,091  0,144 0,034 -0,008  0,141 -0,003     0,648 *** 0,164 0,212 0,475 ** 0,161 0,155 
More than 120 students     0,127  0,231 0,030 -0,024  0,224 -0,006     0,801 ** 0,263 0,165 0,612 * 0,255 0,126 
Denomination (ref. Public schools)                         
Non-religious     -0,005  0,240 -0,001 0,000  0,233 0,000     0,060  0,274 0,012 -0,103  0,266 -0,020 
Religious     -0,231  0,145 -0,086 -0,253  0,140 -0,094     -0,034  0,166 -0,011 -0,076  0,159 -0,025 
School community     0,960 *** 0,194 0,242 0,710 *** 0,193 0,179     -0,897 *** 0,222 -0,198 -0,643 ** 0,219 -0,142 
One year comprehensive class     0,111  0,237 0,042 0,119  0,227 0,045     -0,190  0,270 -0,063 -0,336  0,258 -0,111 
Two year comprehensive class     -0,013  0,235 -0,005 0,012  0,225 0,005     -0,272  0,268 -0,091 -0,337  0,256 -0,112 
Social selectivity                         
Difference score girls         0,039 *** 0,007 0,257         -0,031 *** 0,008 -0,180 
Difference score non-western         0,014 * 0,007 0,118         0,003  0,008 0,018 
Difference score one-parent households         0,019 * 0,008 0,148         0,041 *** 0,010 0,278 
Difference score high SES         -0,028 ** 0,011 -0,132         0,000  0,012 0,001 
                         
R2 0,077    0,142    0,224    0,060    0,138    0,225    
N 413    413    413    413    413    413    
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Robustness checks 
We scrutinize our results by executing a few robustness checks. All results are presented in 
Appendix 3. First, we replace our performance indicator with an average deviation from the 
nationwide yearly central exam average for the subjects math and Dutch, to get another 
measure of performance in secondary education. We observe a similar correlation between 
opportunity and exam results for both HAVO and VWO and the analyses of relative 
preference and quality yield somewhat lower explained variances. Regression results yield 
similar conclusions about our hypotheses. For both HAVO and VWO schools, the exception 
is that the quality selection hypothesis does not hold anymore when it comes to high SES 
parents. Moreover, there is a preference for opportunity when selecting on non-western 
migrants at HAVO.  
We also checked whether the results would be different if we analysed the exam 
results for Dutch and mathematics separately. For both HAVO and VWO we observe a 
negative correlation with quality for schools that select more non-western students than the 
supply radius suggests in the case of subject Dutch. For the over-selection of girls, it holds 
that for both HAVO and VWO it is positively correlated with quality and with a preference 
for opportunity. 
Secondly, we checked for the VWO schools whether offering Latin and Ancient 
Greek, and thus being considered a gymnasium, mattered for the quality and relative 
preference. It does not correlate significantly with the quality variable and for relative 
preference it holds that it correlates with a preference for performance.  
5. Conclusions and discussion 
In this paper we tried to address the question to what extent there is a trade-off between 
performance and opportunity in the academic tracks in Dutch secondary education. Our 
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results suggest that performance and opportunity are only modestly correlated and not more 
than approximately 55% of the schools experience performance-opportunity trade-offs. This 
indicates that a trade-off between opportunity and performance in education is not always the 
case. While this in itself is an important finding, we think we contribute to the literature in 
two important ways.  
The first innovation of our study is that we explicitly model two dimensions on which 
schools differ: quality and relative preference. Quality can be defined as a situation in which 
schools simultaneously increase opportunity and performance, while relative preference is 
defined as increasing one at the cost of the other. We constructed both dimensions in an 
orthogonal way, so that we can separately look at which school characteristics are related to 
quality and which are related to relative preferences.  
The explained variance of the regressions shows that differences between schools are 
quite well related with our explanatory variables: the explained variance ranges between 22% 
and 37%. Given that our limited set of indicators focuses more on structural school 
characteristics and student composition, and not on the quality of the education process itself, 
such as learning materials, classroom and teacher characteristics, we suggest that the input of 
schools together with the structural choices of schools are important when explaining quality, 
and even more important when explaining the relative preference of a school in pursuing 
either opportunity or performance. The fact that the relative preference of schools is strongly 
explained by our analysis, suggests that this is a meaningful dimension alongside the quality 
dimension. At the same time, we suggest that future research should incorporate indicators on 
the education process itself.  
In the study we used register data to answer our questions. The register data allowed 
us to get information on all publicly funded schools. Having register data allows for sufficient 
statistical power and lowers the risk of response bias that often hampers research based on 
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surveys. The use of register data also allowed for a second innovation in our analyses: how 
we deal with the effects of student composition. Since there is no catchment area policy in the 
Netherlands, and governmental funding of schools is equally distributed over schools, the 
actual school composition of students could be an artefact of the potential student 
composition in the school’s supply radius. However, which students from the supply radius 
are selected is partly dependent on the policy of the schools. By explicitly distinguishing 
between the potential student composition in the school’s supply radius and the actual student 
composition as a result of (self-)selection into the school, we get a better understanding of the 
effects of student composition on school’s quality or school’s relative preference. The results 
show that (self-)selection on girls and high SES parents are associated with a higher quality 
for both HAVO and VWO. A relative preference for opportunity over performance is 
associated with a stronger (self-)selection on girls, while the opposite is true for a stronger 
(self-)selection on high SES parents.  
The most important conclusion is related to how schools organise track placement in 
the first few years. The analyses show that in VWO-tracks comprehensive ability classes are 
associated with a higher quality as well as a relative preference for opportunity. Moreover, in 
VWO, single-track schools are associated with a relative preference for performance over 
opportunity. In HAVO-tracks we see something similar. Here schools that are part of school 
communities (these are schools that offer three tracks or more) are associated with a higher 
quality as well as a relative preference for opportunity. This can be explained by the fact that 
such school communities can more easily accommodate between-track mobility than for 
example single-track schools.  
The key message is that our analyses show that schools can evade a possible 
unwanted trade-off between opportunity and performance by installing comprehensive 
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classes or being part of a school community. More in general, to organise the track placement 
such that options to change tracks are still open after the first decision moment.  
Research shows that a consequence of early selection into tracks is that 
socioeconomic inequalities increase (e.g. Chmielewski, 2019; Van de Werfhorst, 2018). The 
consequential inequalities of selection are said to be tolerable if they stem from meritocratic 
principles as effort, ability and preference, and not from factors that are beyond the student’s 
influence, such as ethnicity, gender and socioeconomic status of the parents. However, 
scholars pointed towards the possibility that even then these tolerable inequalities might be 
problematic, since the selection instruments are prone to error along the lines of the 
intolerable inequalities (see also Cameron, Daga, & Outhred, 2018; Montt, 2010).  
Our results suggest that selection of students into schools indeed induces differences 
between schools, which violates the meritocratic principle outlined above. Moreover, the 
finding that flexibility mechanisms within the institutional structure of a school, such as 
school communities (HAVO) and comprehensive classes (VWO), are fruitful for both giving 
opportunity without harming performance is an important finding. Moreover, it is at odds 
with a trend in Dutch secondary education to increase the number of homogeneous first year 
classes and single-track schools (Inspectorate of Education, 2016). It is also at odds with a 
common understood assumption that giving opportunities would have a detrimental effect on 
the quality scores of schools. Our research shows that rather the opposite is true. In other 
words, our research suggests that reversing the trend towards more homogenous tracked 
classes could affect both opportunity and performance positively. 
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Appendix 1 
Operationalisation dependent variable3 
Operationalisation exam results 
First, we use the deviation from the nationwide within-track average of both Dutch and 
mathematics on the central exit exams. This is because these courses are mandatory for 
everyone, and thus useful in comparable regard. The theoretical scale on which the exam 
results are expressed ranges from 1 to 10. As a first step, we calculate the individual student’s 
deviation from the nationwide average for each school year for Dutch and mathematics 
separately. Next, we aggregated that to the school level. Lastly, these differences are, equally 
weighted, averaged together to get a final school difference score. A negative score means 
that the school scores on Dutch and mathematics are below the nationwide average, a positive 
score means that these scores are above the nationwide average.  
Operationalisation independent variables 
If the independent variables were constructed at the individual, student level, they are 
subsequently aggregated to the school level. Since the timeframe of student observations in 
the register ranges from 2010/2011 until 2017/2018, the independent variables will be 
observed in the year they obtain their first secondary education degree. Ethnicity, SES, type 
of household and gender are variables that are used to count students in school’s supply 
radius. As explained in the main text, we selected only potential students in the school supply 
radius by looking at students that have a primary school recommendation which would allow 
access to the track.  
 
3 The operationalisation of dependent variables performance, opportunity, quality and relative 
preference are described in the main text.  
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Ethnicity – The ethnicity of the student was inferred by looking at the country of birth of the 
student and his/her parents. If the student or at least one of his/her parents was born in one of 
the countries of the continent of Africa, Latin America and Asia (excluding Indonesia and 
Japan) or Turkey, the student is considered to be a non-western migrant. The variable was 
obtained from the register. 
Socio-economic status – The paternal household income was measured at the year of 
obtaining the secondary education diploma in percentiles of the nationwide distribution of 
incomes and obtained from the register. For the school’s supply radius, the percentage of 
students with a paternal income in the 80th or higher percentile was counted. Since most 
mothers and fathers live in the same household, the high correlation between the paternal and 
maternal household income forced us to only use paternal income.   
Type of household – This indicator consists of a category of (1) one-parent household, (2) 
two-parent household and a category (3) other. The categories are derived from the register. 
We took at the type of household in the year of graduation. The one-parent household 
percentage in the school’s supply radius was subsequently calculated.  
Gender – Derived from the register: (0) is male and (1) female. The percentage females in the 
school’s supply radius was subsequently calculated.  
Comprehensive ability classes – Although using the third-year entry cohort as a selection 
criterion, we incorporate the history of the students of a school in that entry cohort, by 
assigning the school to the type of class they have in the first two years of secondary 
education. This variable has been obtained by counting the more precise element codes in the 
registration of the school in the first two years. For each year, we considered a school 
offering a comprehensive class if more than 10 students in the register were coded as being in 
a class with at least two adjacent tracks. This threshold of 10 is arbitrary but has been applied 
because it is very unlikely to have a class with less than 10 students. In the case that less than 
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10 students are observed, most likely these students were wrongly registered as being in a 
comprehensive class. The categories of this indicator are (0) no comprehensive class, (1) only 
first year comprehensive class and (2) first- and second-year comprehensive class4.  
Track size – The track size within the school was inferred by aggregating the number of 
students that was linked to the school identifier in the register of the same track level in year 
three. Subsequently, we created a set of dummies: 0-60, 61 – 120, 121 or more, which is 
more or less equivalent to 1-2 classes, 3-4 classes, 5 or more classes.  
Urbanisation level of school municipality – from the register, we linked the urbanisation level 
of the municipality to the secondary school. The variable contains five categories (1) not 
urban, (2) somewhat urban, (3) moderately urban, (4) strongly urban and (5) very strongly 
urban.  
Denomination of school – The register contains the specific religious denomination of the 
school. We grouped them into (0) public, (1) non-religious denomination (2) religious 
denomination. The public category also included a couple of mixed denomination schools. 
Analyses with and without those mixed denomination schools yielded no differences in 
results.   
School community – We sorted the schools based on their structure into schools that offer a 
school community, that is (1) three or more tracks available or (0) less than three tracks 
available. This indicator is only used at HAVO.  
Single-track schools - We sorted the schools based on their structure into schools that offer 
(1) only one track or (0) more than one track. This indicator is only used at VWO. 
 
4 It is known that this division is most likely a lower bound effect, since it might be that school 
register their separate HAVO and VWO classes as being HAVO/VWO classes. Therefore, we 
only know for sure that the homogeneous classes are homogeneous, but not that heterogeneous 
classes are heterogeneous per se.  
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Primary school recommendation versus test score – Some primary schools give 
systematically higher recommendations than other primary schools. If a secondary education 
school recruits more students from such lenient primary schools, they are in a disadvantaged 
situation compared to a secondary education school whose student inflow consists more of 
students that come from more strict primary schools. To correct for this, we look at the 
difference between the primary school teachers’ recommendation and the recommendation 
based on test score. The test taken at the end of primary school was the CITO-test. The test 
was not compulsory but the vast majority of schools took that test (Timmermans, et al., 
2018). The scores correspond to a certain level of track that the pupil could enter in 
secondary education. We counted the percentage of students that had a higher primary school 
teachers’ recommendation than the test recommendation.  
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Appendix 2 
 
Performance and opportunity 
In the VWO track, schools score higher on the performance indicator if their supply radius 
contains more high SES students, if they are single-track schools and if they select more high 
SES students than expected in their supply radius. The effect sizes (beta’s) of those 
correlations are also large, between 0.264 and 0.291. The performance of schools is lower 
when they are confronted with students that come from primary schools that systematically 
give recommendations that are too high compared to the test results. For the opportunity 
indicator it holds that schools score lower if in their supply radius there are more students 
from a one-parent household, if the school is a single-track school, and if they select on high 
SES students. They score higher if their denomination is religious, when they offer one- or 
two-year comprehensive tracks and when they have more girls than their supply ratio would 
suggest. Single-track schools and one- or two-year comprehensive classes have a quite large 
effect size of -0.220, 0.463 and 0.415 respectively.  
For the HAVO track, the results suggest that the performance score is positively 
correlated with the share of non-western and high SES students in the supply radius5, with a 
track size between 60 and 120 students and with schools that select more high SES students 
than the supply radius composition would suggest. It is negatively correlated with an inflow 
of students whose recommendation is higher than the end test score would indicate. The 
effect size of selection on high SES is particularly large, the coefficient is .306. Schools score 
higher on the opportunity indicator if there are more girls in the supply radius of the school, if 
 
5 Although on face value this might seem counterintuitive, the negative coefficient of non-western 
migrants turns positive once SES enters the regression equation. This suggests that a supply 
radius with more poorer students explain performance and not school supply radius with a high 
share of non-western students.  
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the school is located in a more urbanised municipality, when the school is part of school 
community and when the school selects more girls than the supply radius would suggest. A 
medium sized school track between 60 and 120 students is negatively correlated with 
opportunity. Especially urbanisation and more selection of girls have large effect sizes of 
around .3. 
For opportunity and performance at both academic tracks it holds that our explanatory 
variables in the regression explain substantive amount of variance (for HAVO 0.245 and 
0.204 and for VWO 0.439 and 0.236, respectively). Results are to be found in Tables A1 and 
Table A2. 
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Table A1 VWO Regressions on Performance & Opportunity 
 Performance           Opportunity         
 M1    M2    M3    M1    M2    M3    
 b  se beta b  se beta b  se beta b  se beta b  se beta b  se beta 
Constant 0,203  0,654  0,104  0,656  -1,462 * 0,730  0,780  0,677  -0,065  0,556  -0,065  0,625  
                         
Composition of 5km supply radius                         
% girls -0,991  0,958 -0,050 -1,060  0,922 -0,053 -0,336  0,943 -0,017 -0,046  0,992 -0,002 0,092  0,782 0,005 0,975  0,808 0,049 
% students with non-western migration background 0,140  0,948 0,011 0,132  0,935 0,010 0,151  0,922 0,011 1,005  0,982 0,076 0,348  0,793 0,026 0,470  0,790 0,036 
% one-parent households -0,535  1,256 -0,028 -0,691  1,224 -0,036 -0,074  1,241 -0,004 -1,135  1,301 -0,059 -1,387  1,039 -0,072 -2,155 * 1,063 -0,111 
% high SES 1,723 ** 0,606 0,145 1,600 ** 0,599 0,135 3,454 *** 0,692 0,291 -0,007  0,627 -0,001 -0,511  0,508 -0,043 -1,161  0,593 -0,098 
Urbanisation (ref. Not urban)                         
Somewhat urban 0,260  0,299 0,097 0,236  0,290 0,088 0,194  0,280 0,072 -0,413  0,310 -0,155 -0,192  0,246 -0,072 -0,192  0,240 -0,072 
Moderately urban 0,178  0,301 0,075 0,127  0,294 0,053 0,035  0,284 0,015 -0,524  0,311 -0,221 -0,215  0,249 -0,091 -0,169  0,243 -0,071 
Strongly urban 0,378  0,307 0,181 0,241  0,301 0,116 0,125  0,291 0,060 -0,575  0,318 -0,275 -0,067  0,255 -0,032 -0,010  0,249 -0,005 
Very strongly urban 0,280  0,355 0,115 0,096  0,347 0,040 0,045  0,336 0,019 -0,581  0,367 -0,240 0,015  0,295 0,006 0,038  0,287 0,016 
% recommendation higher than test score -0,039 *** 0,008 -0,237 -0,036 *** 0,008 -0,220 -0,028 *** 0,008 -0,170 -0,008  0,009 -0,048 -0,004  0,007 -0,025 -0,010  0,007 -0,059 
Track size (ref. (0-60 students)                         
60-120 students     0,079  0,105 0,040 -0,045  0,105 -0,022     -0,253 ** 0,089 -0,126 -0,152  0,090 -0,076 
More than 120 students     0,279  0,156 0,096 0,118  0,153 0,040     -0,262 * 0,132 -0,090 -0,155  0,131 -0,053 
Denomination (ref. Public schools)                         
Non-religious     0,085  0,177 0,025 -0,002  0,172 0,000     0,214  0,150 0,062 0,249  0,147 0,072 
Religious     -0,106  0,104 -0,052 -0,141  0,101 -0,069     0,255 ** 0,088 0,125 0,252 ** 0,087 0,124 
Single-track schools     1,008 *** 0,222 0,293 0,905 *** 0,218 0,264     -0,939 *** 0,188 -0,273 -0,756 *** 0,187 -0,220 
One year comprehensive class     0,187  0,174 0,092 0,165  0,168 0,081     0,927 *** 0,147 0,455 0,943 *** 0,144 0,463 
Two year comprehensive class     0,158  0,174 0,078 0,211  0,168 0,104     0,882 *** 0,147 0,436 0,840 *** 0,144 0,415 
Social selectivity                         
Difference score girls         0,004  0,005 0,033         0,020 *** 0,005 0,177 
Difference score non-western         -0,001  0,006 -0,010         0,006  0,005 0,045 
Difference score one-parent households         0,028 *** 0,007 0,275         -0,012 * 0,006 -0,123 
Difference score high SES         -0,017  0,009 -0,091         -0,003  0,008 -0,016 
                         
R2 0,083    0,169    0,236    0,017    0,401    0,439    
N 429    429    429    429    429    429    
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Table A2 HAVO Regressions on Performance & Opportunity 
 Performance          Opportunity           
 M1    M2    M3    M1    M2    M3    
 b  se beta b  se beta b  se beta b  se beta b  se beta b  se beta 
Constant -0,227  0,789  -0,316  0,811  -1,213  0,814  -0,433  0,814  -1,541  0,804  -2,088 ** 0,793  
                         
Composition of 5km supply radius                         
% girls 1,232  1,168 0,051 1,216  1,169 0,050 1,641  1,177 0,067 0,480  1,206 0,020 0,908  1,158 0,037 2,944 * 1,147 0,121 
% students with non-western migration background 0,853  0,747 0,101 1,004  0,753 0,118 1,450 * 0,731 0,171 -0,873  0,771 -0,103 -0,505  0,746 -0,060 -0,358  0,712 -0,042 
% one-parent households -2,102  1,249 -0,123 -2,168  1,271 -0,127 -2,311  1,271 -0,135 -2,264  1,289 -0,133 -2,038  1,259 -0,119 -2,143  1,238 -0,125 
% high SES 1,870 ** 0,648 0,160 1,824 ** 0,660 0,156 3,254 *** 0,696 0,279 -0,086  0,669 -0,007 0,579  0,654 0,050 0,175  0,678 0,015 
Urbanisation (ref. Not urban)                         
Somewhat urban -0,249  0,263 -0,094 -0,301  0,262 -0,113 -0,279  0,253 -0,105 0,196  0,272 0,073 0,201  0,260 0,075 0,216  0,246 0,081 
Moderately urban -0,303  0,261 -0,130 -0,421  0,261 -0,181 -0,382  0,252 -0,165 0,517  0,270 0,222 0,614 * 0,259 0,264 0,582 * 0,246 0,251 
Strongly urban -0,299  0,262 -0,142 -0,384  0,262 -0,183 -0,350  0,253 -0,166 0,647 * 0,271 0,307 0,727 ** 0,260 0,346 0,742 ** 0,246 0,353 
Very strongly urban -0,488  0,320 -0,196 -0,540  0,320 -0,217 -0,456  0,310 -0,183 0,881 ** 0,330 0,353 0,971 ** 0,317 0,390 0,910 ** 0,302 0,365 
% recommendation higher than test score -0,029 *** 0,008 -0,171 -0,027 ** 0,009 -0,159 -0,024 ** 0,008 -0,144 0,007  0,009 0,040 -0,003  0,009 -0,020 -0,008  0,008 -0,050 
Track size (ref. (0-60 students)                         
60-120 students     0,370 *** 0,110 0,181 0,233 * 0,108 0,115     -0,279 * 0,109 -0,137 -0,242 * 0,106 -0,119 
More than 120 students     0,464 ** 0,176 0,143 0,294  0,172 0,091     -0,337  0,174 -0,104 -0,318  0,168 -0,098 
Denomination (ref. Public schools)                         
Non-religious     0,028  0,183 0,008 -0,052  0,179 -0,015     -0,033  0,182 -0,010 0,051  0,174 0,015 
Religious     -0,133  0,111 -0,065 -0,165  0,107 -0,081     -0,098  0,110 -0,048 -0,089  0,104 -0,043 
School community     0,032  0,148 0,010 0,033  0,148 0,011     0,929 *** 0,147 0,309 0,677 *** 0,144 0,225 
One year comprehensive class     -0,039  0,180 -0,019 -0,109  0,174 -0,054     0,150  0,179 0,075 0,228  0,170 0,113 
Two year comprehensive class     -0,143  0,179 -0,071 -0,162  0,172 -0,081     0,130  0,177 0,065 0,174  0,168 0,087 
Social selectivity                         
Difference score girls         0,004  0,006 0,034         0,035 *** 0,006 0,305 
Difference score non-western         0,008  0,005 0,092         0,006  0,005 0,064 
Difference score one-parent households         0,030 *** 0,006 0,306         -0,011  0,006 -0,112 
Difference score high SES         -0,014  0,008 -0,086         -0,014  0,008 -0,088 
                         
R2 0,097    0,132    0,204    0,038    0,148    0,245    
N 413    413    413    413    413    413    
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Appendix 3 Results robustness checks 
Table A3. VWO Regressions Exam, Exam Quality and Exam Relative preferences 
 Exam    Exam Quality   Exam Relative Preferences  
 Model 3    Model 3    Model 3    
 b  se beta b  se beta b  se beta 
(Constant) -0,756  0,776  -0,821  0,907  -0,691  1,079  
             
Composition of 5km supply radius             
% girls 0,103  1,003 0,005 1,077  1,172 0,045 -0,872  1,395 -0,027 
% students with non-western migration background -0,400  0,980 -0,030 0,070  1,145 0,005 -0,869  1,363 -0,041 
% one-parent households -0,758  1,319 -0,039 -2,913  1,541 -0,127 1,396  1,834 0,045 
% high SES 2,085 ** 0,736 0,176 0,924  0,860 0,066 3,246 ** 1,024 0,170 
Urbanisation (ref. Not urban)             
Somewhat urban -0,114  0,298 -0,043 -0,307  0,348 -0,097 0,078  0,414 0,018 
Moderately urban -0,119  0,302 -0,050 -0,288  0,353 -0,103 0,049  0,420 0,013 
Strongly urban -0,025  0,309 -0,012 -0,035  0,361 -0,014 -0,015  0,430 -0,005 
Very strongly urban 0,097  0,357 0,040 0,135  0,417 0,047 0,058  0,496 0,015 
% recommendation higher than test score -0,011  0,009 -0,066 -0,021 * 0,010 -0,106 -0,001  0,012 -0,004 
Track size (ref. (0-60 students)             
60-120 students 0,230 * 0,112 0,115 0,078  0,131 0,033 0,382 * 0,155 0,118 
More than 120 students 0,094  0,163 0,032 -0,061  0,190 -0,018 0,249  0,227 0,053 
Denomination (ref. Public schools)             
Non-religious -0,126  0,183 -0,037 0,122  0,213 0,030 -0,375  0,254 -0,068 
Religious 0,011  0,108 0,005 0,262 * 0,126 0,109 -0,241  0,150 -0,073 
Single-track schools 0,466 * 0,232 0,136 -0,289  0,271 -0,071 1,222 *** 0,323 0,221 
One year comprehensive class -0,205  0,178 -0,101 0,738 *** 0,208 0,306 -1,148 *** 0,248 -0,349 
Two year comprehensive class -0,284  0,179 -0,140 0,556 ** 0,209 0,232 -1,124 *** 0,248 -0,345 
Social selectivity             
Difference score girls -0,004  0,006 -0,032 0,016 * 0,007 0,123 -0,023 ** 0,008 -0,130 
Difference score non-western -0,009  0,007 -0,076 -0,004  0,008 -0,026 -0,015  0,009 -0,075 
Difference score one-parent households 0,005  0,007 0,049 -0,007  0,008 -0,062 0,017  0,010 0,107 
Difference score high SES -0,007  0,010 -0,037 -0,010  0,011 -0,045 -0,004  0,014 -0,013 
             
             
N 413    413    413    
R2 0,136    0,158    0,357    
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Table A4. Regressions on Quality and Relative Preferences dimensions for Language and Math subjects separately at VWO track. 
 
Language 
Quality 
   Language 
Relative 
Preferences 
   Math 
Quality 
   Math 
Relative 
Preferences 
   
 
Model 3    Model 3    Model 3    Model 3    
 
b  se beta b  se beta b  se beta b  se beta 
(Constant) 0,322  0,929  0,452  1,033  -0,980  0,932  -0,849  1,054  
 
                
Composition of 5km supply radius                 
% girls 1,812  1,200 0,071 -0,138  1,335 -0,004 0,591  1,205 0,024 -1,358  1,363 -0,043 
% students with non-western migration background -2,773 * 1,173 -0,166 -3,712 ** 1,305 -0,183 1,189  1,177 0,073 0,250  1,332 0,012 
% one-parent households -2,080  1,579 -0,084 2,229  1,756 0,075 -3,705 * 1,584 -0,155 0,604  1,793 0,020 
% high SES -1,140  0,881 -0,076 1,182  0,980 0,065 1,752 * 0,884 0,120 4,075 *** 1,000 0,218 
Urbanisation (ref. Not urban)                 
Somewhat urban -0,325  0,356 -0,095 0,060  0,396 0,015 -0,236  0,358 -0,072 0,149  0,405 0,035 
Moderately urban -0,319  0,361 -0,106 0,018  0,402 0,005 -0,303  0,362 -0,104 0,034  0,410 0,009 
Strongly urban -0,001  0,370 0,000 0,019  0,411 0,006 -0,085  0,371 -0,033 -0,066  0,420 -0,020 
Very strongly urban 0,000  0,427 0,000 -0,076  0,475 -0,020 0,132  0,429 0,044 0,056  0,485 0,015 
% recommendation higher than test score -0,024 * 0,010 -0,114 -0,004  0,011 -0,017 -0,021 * 0,010 -0,104 -0,002  0,012 -0,006 
Track size (ref. (0-60 students)                 
60-120 students -0,123  0,134 -0,048 0,182  0,149 0,059 0,069  0,134 0,028 0,373 * 0,152 0,118 
More than 120 students -0,370  0,195 -0,099 -0,060  0,217 -0,013 -0,004  0,196 -0,001 0,306  0,221 0,067 
Denomination (ref. Public schools)                 
Non-religious 0,104  0,219 0,024 -0,393  0,243 -0,074 0,117  0,219 0,028 -0,380  0,248 -0,070 
Religious 0,263 * 0,129 0,101 -0,240  0,143 -0,076 0,240  0,129 0,095 -0,263  0,146 -0,082 
Single-track schools -0,265  0,278 -0,061 1,247 *** 0,309 0,235 -0,528  0,279 -0,125 0,984 ** 0,316 0,182 
One year comprehensive class 0,731 *** 0,213 0,282 -1,155 *** 0,237 -0,367 0,744 *** 0,214 0,296 -1,142 *** 0,242 -0,356 
Two year comprehensive class 0,832 *** 0,214 0,323 -0,848 *** 0,238 -0,272 0,455 * 0,214 0,182 -1,226 *** 0,243 -0,385 
Social selectivity                 
Difference score girls 0,020 ** 0,007 0,141 -0,020 * 0,008 -0,114 0,015 * 0,007 0,112 -0,024 ** 0,008 -0,138 
Difference score non-western -0,028 *** 0,008 -0,181 -0,040 *** 0,009 -0,208 0,012  0,008 0,081 0,001  0,009 0,006 
Difference score one-parent households -0,015  0,008 -0,118 0,010  0,009 0,062 0,000  0,008 -0,001 0,025 ** 0,010 0,156 
Difference score high SES -0,015  0,012 -0,065 -0,010  0,013 -0,033 -0,012  0,012 -0,050 -0,006  0,013 -0,019 
 
                
 
                
N 413    413    413    413    
R2 0,236    0,357    0,180    0,356    
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Table A5. VWO Regressions on Quality and Relative Preferences with Gymnasium indicator 
 
Gymnasium 
Quality     
Gymnasium 
Relative 
Preferences    
 Model 3    Model 3    
 b  se beta b  se beta 
(Constant) -1,463  0,831  -1,647  1,060  
         
Composition of 5km supply radius         
% girls 0,594  1,073 0,026 -1,137  1,368 -0,035 
% students with non-western migration background 0,664  1,049 0,044 -0,489  1,337 -0,023 
% one-parent households -2,168  1,411 -0,097 1,844  1,800 0,059 
% high SES 2,287 ** 0,787 0,166 4,637 *** 1,004 0,240 
Urbanisation (ref. Not urban)         
Somewhat urban -0,014  0,319 -0,005 0,446  0,406 0,102 
Moderately urban -0,153  0,323 -0,056 0,280  0,412 0,073 
Strongly urban 0,094  0,331 0,039 0,219  0,422 0,064 
Very strongly urban 0,062  0,382 0,022 0,091  0,487 0,023 
% recommendation higher than test score -0,037 *** 0,009 -0,193 -0,022  0,012 -0,081 
Track size (ref. (0-60 students)         
60-120 students -0,173  0,121 -0,075 0,014  0,154 0,004 
More than 120 students -0,014  0,175 -0,004 0,181  0,223 0,038 
Denomination (ref. Public schools)         
Non-religious 0,260  0,196 0,065 -0,302  0,249 -0,054 
Religious 0,115  0,115 0,049 -0,408 ** 0,147 -0,123 
Single-track schools 0,375  0,306 0,094 0,783 * 0,390 0,140 
% of track gymnasium -0,003  0,003 -0,085 0,013 *** 0,003 0,235 
One year comprehensive class 1,100 *** 0,191 0,465 -0,747 ** 0,243 -0,225 
Two year comprehensive class 1,023 *** 0,192 0,436 -0,519 * 0,245 -0,158 
Social selectivity         
Difference score girls 0,023 *** 0,006 0,176 -0,014  0,008 -0,074 
Difference score non-western 0,004  0,007 0,031 -0,007  0,009 -0,036 
Difference score one-parent households 0,015 * 0,007 0,130 0,041 *** 0,010 0,248 
Difference score high SES -0,019  0,011 -0,086 -0,019  0,013 -0,061 
         
N 413    413    
R2 0,267    0,397    
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Table A6. HAVO Regression with Exam averages as dependent variable and incorporated in the Quality and Relative Preferences dimensions.  
 Exam    Exam Quality   Exam Relative Preferences  
 Model 3    Model 3    Model 3    
 b  se beta b  se beta b  se beta 
(Constant) -0,935  0,853  -3,023 ** 1,058  1,153  1,262  
             
Composition of 5km supply radius             
% girls 0,236  1,234 0,010 3,180 * 1,530 0,100 -2,708  1,825 -0,073 
% students with non-western migration background -0,318  0,766 -0,038 -0,676  0,950 -0,061 0,039  1,133 0,003 
% one-parent households -1,016  1,332 -0,059 -3,159  1,652 -0,142 1,127  1,971 0,043 
% high SES 1,527 * 0,729 0,131 1,703  0,904 0,112 1,352  1,079 0,076 
Urbanisation (ref. Not urban)             
Somewhat urban 0,152  0,265 0,057 0,368  0,329 0,106 -0,064  0,392 -0,016 
Moderately urban 0,053  0,264 0,023 0,635  0,328 0,210 -0,529  0,391 -0,150 
Strongly urban 0,042  0,265 0,020 0,784 * 0,329 0,286 -0,700  0,392 -0,219 
Very strongly urban 0,106  0,325 0,043 1,017 * 0,403 0,313 -0,804  0,481 -0,212 
% recommendation higher than test score -0,009  0,009 -0,054 -0,017  0,011 -0,080 -0,001  0,013 -0,002 
Track size (ref. (0-60 students)             
60-120 students 0,117  0,114 0,057 -0,124  0,141 -0,047 0,359 * 0,168 0,116 
More than 120 students -0,102  0,180 -0,031 -0,420  0,224 -0,100 0,216  0,267 0,044 
Denomination (ref. Public schools)             
Non-religious -0,192  0,188 -0,057 -0,141  0,233 -0,032 -0,243  0,278 -0,047 
Religious 0,185  0,112 0,091 0,096  0,139 0,036 0,274  0,166 0,088 
School community 0,221  0,155 0,073 0,898 *** 0,192 0,229 -0,456 * 0,229 -0,100 
One year comprehensive class 0,104  0,183 0,052 0,332  0,227 0,126 -0,124  0,270 -0,040 
Two year comprehensive class 0,195  0,181 0,098 0,369  0,224 0,142 0,021  0,267 0,007 
Social selectivity             
Difference score girls -0,002  0,006 -0,018 0,033 *** 0,007 0,221 -0,037 *** 0,009 -0,213 
Difference score non-western -0,017 ** 0,006 -0,184 -0,011  0,007 -0,092 -0,022 ** 0,008 -0,163 
Difference score one-parent households -0,001  0,007 -0,014 -0,012  0,008 -0,097 0,010  0,010 0,064 
Difference score high SES -0,013  0,008 -0,079 -0,027 * 0,010 -0,129 0,001  0,012 0,006 
             
N 413    413    413    
R2 0,126    0,207    0,169    
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Table A7. Regressions on Quality and Relative Preferences dimensions for Language and Math subjects separately at HAVO track.  
 
Language 
Quality    
Language 
Relative 
Preferences    
Math 
Quality    
Math 
Relative 
Preferences    
  Model 3    Model 3    Model 3    Model 3    
 b  se beta b  se beta b  se beta b  se beta 
(Constant) -2,782 ** 1,074  1,394  1,237  -2,273 * 1,090  1,903  1,219  
                 
Composition of 5km supply radius                 
% girls 4,026 ** 1,553 0,123 -1,862  1,790 -0,052 2,125  1,577 0,064 -3,763 * 1,763 -0,105 
% students with non-western migration background -2,371 * 0,964 -0,208 -1,655  1,111 -0,132 0,641  0,979 0,056 1,357  1,094 0,109 
% one-parent households -0,199  1,677 -0,009 4,087 * 1,933 0,161 -6,307 *** 1,703 -0,272 -2,021  1,904 -0,081 
% high SES -0,047  0,918 -0,003 -0,398  1,058 -0,023 2,037 * 0,932 0,129 1,686  1,042 0,098 
Urbanisation (ref. Not urban)                 
Somewhat urban 0,245  0,333 0,069 -0,186  0,384 -0,047 0,380  0,339 0,105 -0,052  0,378 -0,013 
Moderately urban 0,640  0,333 0,205 -0,525  0,384 -0,152 0,638  0,338 0,202 -0,527  0,378 -0,154 
Strongly urban 0,776 * 0,334 0,275 -0,708  0,384 -0,227 0,758 * 0,339 0,266 -0,726  0,379 -0,235 
Very strongly urban 1,022 * 0,409 0,305 -0,799  0,471 -0,216 1,049 * 0,415 0,310 -0,772  0,464 -0,211 
% recommendation higher than test score -0,012  0,011 -0,052 0,005  0,013 0,020 -0,024 * 0,011 -0,107 -0,008  0,013 -0,031 
Track size (ref. (0-60 students)                 
60-120 students -0,273  0,143 -0,100 0,210  0,165 0,069 -0,086  0,145 -0,031 0,397 * 0,162 0,133 
More than 120 students -0,471 * 0,227 -0,108 0,165  0,262 0,034 -0,417  0,230 -0,095 0,219  0,258 0,046 
Denomination (ref. Public schools)                 
Non-religious -0,094  0,236 -0,021 -0,196  0,272 -0,039 -0,239  0,240 -0,052 -0,342  0,268 -0,069 
Religious 0,090  0,142 0,033 0,267  0,163 0,088 -0,001  0,144 0,000 0,176  0,161 0,059 
School community 0,877 *** 0,195 0,217 -0,477 * 0,225 -0,107 1,072 *** 0,198 0,262 -0,282  0,221 -0,064 
One year comprehensive class 0,212  0,230 0,078 -0,244  0,265 -0,082 0,389  0,233 0,142 -0,067  0,261 -0,023 
Two year comprehensive class 0,197  0,228 0,073 -0,152  0,262 -0,051 0,394  0,231 0,145 0,046  0,258 0,016 
Social selectivity                 
Difference score girls 0,050 *** 0,007 0,320 -0,021 * 0,009 -0,121 0,024 ** 0,008 0,155 -0,046 *** 0,008 -0,272 
Difference score non-western -0,020 ** 0,007 -0,165 -0,032 *** 0,008 -0,236 0,002  0,007 0,013 -0,010  0,008 -0,075 
Difference score one-parent households -0,015  0,008 -0,109 0,008  0,010 0,052 -0,011  0,009 -0,078 0,012  0,010 0,079 
Difference score high SES -0,022 * 0,011 -0,105 0,006  0,012 0,024 -0,028 ** 0,011 -0,130 0,000  0,012 0,000 
                 
N 413    413    413    413    
R2 0,232    0,162    0,224    0,173    
 
